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The Age of Lawfare
Dale Stephens*
We are currently living in the age of lawfare; perhaps we always have been.The term, in its relationship to armed conflict, was most recently popu-
larized by Major General Charles Dunlap of the US Air Force in 20011 and has gen-
erated an exponential and diffuse trajectory of meaning and critique since that
time. The term “lawfare” has no real fixed definition, but has come to be generally
understood as the “use or misuse of law as a substitute for traditional military
means to achieve military objectives.”2 It has been examined in the context of do-
mestic US legal practices,3 in transnational legal incidents4 and, of course, within
the realm of public international law, particularly in the context of the law of
armed conflict (LOAC).5 All accounts do share a conception that recognizes that
lawfare is concerned with the instrumentalization or politicization of the law to
achieve a tactical, operational or strategic effect.
The reference to the “use or misuse” of law in the Dunlap definition reveals an
essentially neutral perspective. The fact is that modern State military forces do le-
gitimately use the law to achieve military outcomes. This is done as a substitute for
the application of force and hence represents a form of lawfare so defined. This
may be manifested with, for example, a UN Charter, Chapter VII, “all necessary
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means” Security Council resolution that displaces the law of neutrality or other-
wise shapes the tactical or strategic military environment.6 Alternatively, it may
also be manifested in a formal determination as to whether an armed conflict exists
at all, whether it is international or non-international and/or whether an opposi-
tion group is to obtain prisoner of war rights or not. In this sense, the law is
“weaponized” to achieve a desired military outcome that negates the need to apply
force to obtain the same result. Indeed, recent scholarship on this body of law has
highlighted the notion that LOAC practice itself is a process of construction,
contestation and strategic instrumentalization that usually advantages State mili-
tary forces.7 That the existing architecture of LOAC possesses this apparent bias8
for State military forces is not surprising. Under classical views States are the sub-
jects, and not the objects, of international law. Moreover, from a policy perspec-
tive, this preference is both appropriate and necessary under the existing
international legal structure. This is to ensure the right balance between interna-
tionally recognized military and humanitarian aims in warfare is maintained and
that institutional accountability is effectively preserved.
While States engage in a type of structural lawfare to achieve military aims, the
primary focus of this article is to examine the converse situation, namely, the man-
ner in which lawfare is exercised against States. The strategic use of the law by non-
State groups engaged in asymmetric warfare has been recognized as a significant
tool to obtain military and political advantage. In these contexts, such groups will,
inter alia, invite the application of force against themselves or their proxies, inno-
cent civilians (as incidental injury), or ostensibly civilian objects (that have lost
their protection) that, while strictly lawful, nonetheless generate political costs
and/or moral dilemmas for the attacking force. The goal is to undermine the resolve
of State military forces by generating negative reaction by relevant constituencies
with political power.
Predictably, this type of lawfare prompts reactions concerning the “unfairness”
of legal constraints applying to one side as compared to the wanton disregard of legal
compliance by the other.9 Such asymmetric disadvantage is usually framed in
terms of a dilemma within the literature for Western “law-abiding” military forces
in meeting the threats while retaining a fidelity to the law. Lawfare is thus charac-
terized in the register of formal legality of being a refuge of the weak,10 of being dis-
ingenuous by unfairly manipulating the law to achieve a relevant extra-legal and
asymmetric effect.
It is the purpose of this article to review the phenomenon of lawfare to highlight
how law is situated within the broader political, moral and social terrain of military
decision making. The reactions against lawfare disclose a number of assumptions.
Principally, the reactions against lawfare evidence a particular interpretive attitude
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to LOAC, specifically one based squarely within a positivist orientation. Positivism
remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC, but it contains a number of
vulnerabilities in its theoretical structure. It is a goal of this article to identify such
vulnerabilities and to propose remedies that might be used to prompt a more self-
aware counter-lawfare response within positivism’s interpretive enterprise.
A broader goal is to tackle the issue of how the law is actually employed within
military decision making. It will contend that while LOAC is often expressed in a
key of validity, it should also be understood in a register of legitimacy. The factors
that contribute to such an approach draw upon broader socio-legal and ethical
considerations and these will be canvassed.
To this end, it is submitted that military lawyers and operators alike regularly
synthesize legal propositions with broader political, social and moral consider-
ations when dispensing advice and embarking upon a course of action. In so doing,
this permits a more nuanced and surgical application of force that meets broader
military and political goals. In short, it allows for effective mission accomplish-
ment. It also allows for a firmer foundation in confronting lawfare and its intended
manipulation of moral and political reaction. This assimilation of factors that occurs
when developing legal advice is not always admitted, but it occurs nonetheless, and
should be acknowledged and discussed for what it can add to the military apprecia-
tion process.
This is not to say that the register of formal legal validity has been dispensed
with. Quite the contrary, a formal assessment of law is always the starting point in
any interpretive exercise. Rules are carefully parsed and their linguistic construc-
tion assessed against standard canons of interpretation. However, the law is more
indeterminate, language more malleable and open, than what we might imagine.
In reality, the practice of LOAC takes place against a complex array of normative
factors. Whether reconciled as acting within the “free space” of legal discretion
permitted under positivism’s structure or as a product of government-imposed
policy overlay to ameliorate a rule’s strictness, or indeed some other rationale, the
result is the same. It remains true today that, at least since the Vietnam War, liberal
democratic societies are compelled to wage war through a prism of self-perceived
legitimacy. Modern military lawyers by necessity navigate this complex legal and
political topography as a matter of course. It also means that confronting lawfare
tactics head-on is not as daunting as it may at first seem.
This article is comprised of three parts. Part I will briefly examine the tenor of
claims regarding lawfare so as to situate the subsequent analysis. Part II will canvass
the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC—namely, positivism—and will dem-
onstrate the blind spots and gaps that this methodology generates. It will outline
the remedies that are available to deal with lawfare (i.e., counter-lawfare) either
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under positivism’s method or more broadly under a complementary approach of
LOAC practice within the register of legitimacy. Finally, Part III will conclude by
examining the choices and orientation military lawyers might adopt in the context
of counter-lawfare. To this end, assessment of means-ends rationality, con-
structivism and virtue ethics will be separately undertaken.
Part I. Lawfare and Its Taxonomy
The term “lawfare” has established a distinctly pejorative connotation within the pre-
vailing literature. This seems unusual, as the term itself is value neutral. It is neither
intrinsically “good” nor “bad,” but rather an agnostic phenomenon. Indeed, as out-
lined in the introduction, established State military forces in the conduct of warfare
can deploy a form of structural lawfare.
In the contemporary environment, allegations of lawfare are routinely cited as a
tool used by insurgents or other non-State actors in actions against State military
forces. This is the version of lawfare that has become more typically associated with
the term. Hence, US Army lawyer Eric Jensen identifies that in the context of asym-
metric warfare, an opponent will seek to exploit an adversary’s weaknesses to seek
tactical or strategic advantage. Such weaknesses are not necessarily those of military
capacity, but rather are more intangible and revolve around inciting violent reac-
tion that feeds public disquiet. Thus, “[i]n this type of conflict, the disadvantaged
party must seek to use the comparatively low-tech tools at its disposal to gain the
comparative advantage.”11 Such non-State groups will openly violate the law in
order to strike at a more militarily superior though legally bound (thus restrained)
force. As outlined by Jensen, such subversion takes the form of attacking from pro-
tected places and using protected places or objects as weapons storage sites, fight-
ing without wearing a proper uniform, using human shields to protect military
targets, using protected symbols to gain military advantage, murdering prisoners
or others who are protected and not distinguishing oneself from the general popu-
lation when taking a direct or active part in hostilities.12
The types of incidents detailed by Jensen almost always have an exception for
the use of force by opponents. Under positive prescriptions of the law, protected
places lose their immunity when used for military purposes,13 human shields may
not be directly attacked (at least when not voluntary) but become part of the inci-
dental injury calculation under proportionality assessments,14 and while fighting
without a distinguishing uniform does threaten greater civilian loss due to mis-
identification, it does not prohibit State military forces from targeting those taking
a direct part in hostilities (DPH).15
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The point is not that legal arguments can’t be relied upon in favor of surmount-
ing these tactics, but rather that the political and social consequences of relying
upon such exceptions can cause a negative effect. These exceptions highlight the
moral dilemmas and political and social costs faced by soldiers when engaged in
such conflict.
In this sense, it is significant that the main concern about lawfare is in fact the
broader context in which law is invoked. Hence, as Casey and Rivkin state: “The
term ‘lawfare’ describes the growing use of international law claims, usually factually
or legally meritless, as a tool of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage over your
enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in national
and international tribunals.”16
It became clear during the counterinsurgency (COIN) operation within Iraq
that insurgents invariably used unlawful means to intimidate the population and
discredit the government. The whole point of using such unlawful means was
specifically to invoke an overreaction by counterinsurgent forces. Provoking vio-
lation of counterinsurgent ethics and values in reacting to an insurgency is a
means to an end, namely, discrediting the legitimacy of the host government and
the counterinsurgent forces themselves. As David Kilcullen notes, Al Qaeda in
Iraq drew the majority of its strength from the “backlash engendered by counter-
insurgent overreaction rather than genuine popular support.”17
When examined in these terms, the reaction against lawfare turns out to be less
about the law itself than about the broader question of a political and moral reac-
tion to the application of force that has the capacity to undermine military effec-
tiveness. In this context, LOAC (and its sustaining interpretive model) is not
particularly adept at providing a sufficiently calibrated response. The law is largely
framed in a binary manner. It mainly deals with categories of persons: combatants,
civilians and those hors de combat. It restricts attacks against military objectives18
and prohibits attacks against those objects that are civilian.19 It does not deal very
well with nuance or effect. Hence within this binary code, decisions are made in an
essentially “yes” or “no” manner—viz., this military object over there may be at-
tacked, that civilian one here may not; these civilians are a proportionate loss but
those ones are not. Issues such as whether the object to be attacked is a church or a
mosque that is being used for a military purpose have no formal relevance as a
matter of law. Neither does the question whether the civilians who will incidentally
die as a result of a proportionality equation are individuals who may be part of a
particular broader social network. These underlying social and political factors are
simply accorded no formal legal weight.
Notwithstanding this, attacking such objects, while lawful, will often have the
inevitable effect of galvanizing resistance by a resident population, which, in turn,
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may well undermine broader strategic goals. Similarly, whether an insurgent is a
hard-core fanatic determined to die in his or her cause or an “accidental guerilla”20
loosely swept into a broader movement is of no account as a matter of formal law;
each may be targeted under DPH criteria. While some scholars have ventured that
there may exist some level of cultural relativity in making assessments of “military
advantage” or “proportionate” loss,21 the broad sweep of the law is predicated
upon a conception of exchangeable universal value. There exists a pretense of
mathematical certainty in making assessments of “military advantage units” versus
“civilian loss units.” To this end, the appeal of universality sustains the law. It may
be enough to respond to allegations of lawfare to say that “this is the law” and what
we do is “lawful.” In certain contexts and to certain audiences, such assertions may
be conclusive. In other circumstances and for other audiences, they may not be.
The reference to “the court of world opinion” identified by Rivkin and Casey
has both an international and a domestic application. As discussed above, entirely
lawful attacks within a theater of operations can result in popular resentment by
those within that battlespace that translates into practical resistance. Equally,
resistance may be manifested within domestic polities at home and can galvanize
domestic reaction and decisively undermine military capacity. Hence, as Dunlap
has observed when addressing this issue in the context of the Vietnam War:
The United States has already seen how an enemy can carry out a value-based asym-
metrical strategy. For example, one of the things that America’s enemies have learned
in the latter half of the 20th century is to manipulate democratic values. Consider the
remarks of a former North Vietnamese commander: “The conscience of America was
part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. Amer-
ica lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobi-
lize a will to win.” By stirring up dissension in the United States, the North Vietnamese
were able to advance their strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast
Asia. Democracies are less-resistant to political machinations of this sort than are the
totalitarian systems common to neo-absolutists.22
These lessons have been fully absorbed by military professionals, especially by
military lawyers. It has become clear that there are “good” and “bad” wars, just as
there are wars of necessity and wars of choice.23 Public conscience on issues of
force in relation to both the jus ad bellum and jus in bello has real impact. As a result,
the levels of discretion exercised under the law differ due to imposed government/
command policy restraints. While prevailing textbooks and restatements of LOAC
present a picture of almost clinical certainty, the truth of the matter has always
been more nuanced. Law and legal interpretation are modulated. Legal rectitude is
the starting point and of course universal prohibitions are always formally
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acknowledged (i.e., not attacking civilians, respecting hospital ships, etc.), but legal
interpretation invariably accommodates implicit counter-lawfare elements at
least as a matter of policy overlay. Legitimate targets are not attacked and extraor-
dinary measures are taken to spare civilian populations from any incidental injury.
Is this approach consistent with positivism’s method? Is this really a policy overlay
or does it fall within “proper” legal interpretation? As will be outlined in Part II
below, such accommodations may still be conceived as validly coming within the
structure of positivism’s methodology.
Part II. Positivism, Legitimacy and Lawfare
Law and Morality
Positivism remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC. As an interpretive
style, it is venerable and hardy and has withstood numerous challenges to its domi-
nance throughout the twentieth century. While regarded as too illusory by some
scholars,24 it nonetheless heralded a momentous change to international law when
embraced at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Reading accounts
of international law in the 1920s, one gets a palpable sense of positivism’s great
emancipatory promise.25 While international law in the nineteenth century was
largely bound up in sovereign prerogatives and naturalist conceptions, the onset of
the twentieth century saw law harnessed for progressive causes. Positivism was the
means by which such progress was to be realized. While international courts ini-
tially resisted impositions by positive law on sovereign prerogatives,26 over time
even these nebulous rights were quietly relegated as products of an earlier era.27
The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in his 1962 account The Concept of Law prob-
ably best describes positivism’s contemporary structure.28 To Hart, positivism was
fundamentally centered on a separation thesis, that is, legal validity was not neces-
sarily tied to any moral inquiry.29 Rather law was a combination of primary and
secondary rules that was sustained by an inner social perspective of law’s officials.30
The rule of recognition was the most significant secondary rule,31 and essentially
established what was law in terms of pedigree. The rule of recognition itself was
based upon social fact. Significantly, words did a considerable amount of work
within positivism and Hart conceived of a duality of core and penumbra for fram-
ing interpretive discourse.32 Within the core, words possessed unassailable mean-
ing. Law was thus ascertainable and largely predictable. At the border of the core,
within the narrow penumbral region, the law was less determinate and a broader
level of discretion was permitted to determine legal outcomes. Indeed, Hart al-
lowed for a policy- or legislative-type reasoning within this narrow band.33
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The separation thesis, which sustains much of Hart’s approach, was famously
outlined in an exchange with Harvard professor Lon Fuller in a series of articles
appearing in the 1957–58 edition of the Harvard Law Review.34 In question was the
status of laws passed during the Nazi regime in Germany. Fuller invoked a form of
naturalist legal methodology to argue that such edicts could not constitute law.
Hart presented a differing view; while such laws were morally bankrupt, they
nonetheless still constituted law properly adopted in accordance with a prevail-
ing process.35 Importantly, Hart did fully acknowledge that while they were still
deserving of the name “law,” one could nonetheless rely upon personal moral
grounds not to obey such law.36
This dichotomy reveals much about positivism that has application within
LOAC reasoning and more broadly within the context of lawfare. While it is plain
that “no sensible positivist . . . would claim that morality is never relevant or nec-
essary for legal interpretation,”37 positivism is essentially a non-directive form of
interpretation.38 When one is resolutely within the core meaning of words (and
sentences)39 there remains a requirement to follow the course of such wording to
its necessary end to reach an inevitable legal result. This is done notwithstanding
that what occurs may in fact appear to be “a wrong or unjust or unwise or inequi-
table or silly result.”40 This differentiation between law as it “is” and what it
“ought” to be (at least within the core) has the potential to cause blind spots and
contradictions in legal interpretation. Yet, it is resolutely defended by many as the
appropriate measure of legal interpretation and has resisted inroads by alternative
legal theories. Former US Attorney General Michael Mukasey has, for example,
strenuously argued that government lawyers must ensure they only “do law.”41 He
outlines that a lawyer’s primary duty is
to define the space in which the client may legally act. . . . [T]here will be times when
you will advise clients that the law prohibits them from taking their desired course of
action, or even prohibits them from doing things that are, in your view, the right thing
to do. And there will be times when you will have to advise clients that the law permits
them to take actions that you may find imprudent, or even wrong.42
Judge Higgins in a famous defense of this methodology reaffirmed the perspective
that the practice of law is best conceived of as the application of “neutral princi-
ples” to achieve predictable outcomes.43
This conception is reflected in traditional approaches to interpreting LOAC.
There is usually an emphatic confidence in the literature that LOAC is comprised
of a broad core of validity. To be sure, even a provision such as the famous Martens
clause that makes a direct appeal to the “dictates of public conscience”44 has been
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strenuously argued to be no more than an aid to interpretation of existing positive
law and certainly not a source of legal authority in its own right.45
This reliance upon pedigree of legal norms and the strong confidence placed in
the core structure of words seems a little too emphatic in the literature. Indeed,
such a patois might be read as reflecting a type of anxiety as to the capacity of law to
actually restrain violence. The LOAC project was always placed between a promise
and a fear46 that law would intercede and ameliorate the excess of warfare’s
violence.
Given the strong differentiation between law, morality and policy consider-
ations, at least resident within core meanings of words and sentences, there should
be little surprise that lawfare is derided as unfair. Compliance with the law con-
cerning the propriety of certain attacks is the formal answer to those who take issue
with the moral, social and political consequences of such attacks. Lawyers are ill
equipped to respond with anything more than extolling the virtue of compliance
with the law as it exists. Arguments in support of structural rectitude and of lin-
guistic construction are what sustain legal responses. Despite this, to relevant
publics “out there” such exquisite compliance and faithfulness may not be persua-
sive, indeed may not be worth “two straws.”47 This necessarily leaves open a num-
ber of vulnerabilities to such advocacy.
It also relies upon the picture painted by Hart (and others) that the law com-
prises a large inner core of meaning. If, in fact, the law (especially LOAC) is less de-
terminate than what many imagine, if language is so intrinsically malleable that we
can flip between the core and the penumbra with greater ease than what we antici-
pate, then many of the assumptions that underpin “proper” interpretive technique
become undone. However, in accepting these factors we have new challenges, but
also better opportunities to align legal advice with a greater moral and political
acuity and so may confront lawfare more instrumentally.
Core/Penumbra and the Malleability of Language
Many scholars have critiqued the semantic certainty implicit in the core/penumbra
distinction. Winter, for example, observes that Hart fails to appreciate that the cog-
nitive process of ascribing a purpose to words that we necessarily make means the
“distinction between a policy-free core and a penumbra of ‘legislative’ freedom
necessarily collapses.”48 According to Winter, we all operate in accordance with
tacit knowledge and seek to attribute a meaning to words that will give effect to an
underlying policy. Language is by nature malleable, rendering the placement of a
firewall between open (penumbra) and closed (core) discretion an arbitrary exer-
cise. Duncan Kennedy has adeptly demonstrated that the “self-evident” placement
of words within the core or penumbra is a highly contentious exercise. Hart
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advocated that “plain cases”49 would always be easily discernible, but Kennedy ar-
gues that through “legal work”50 we can find ourselves within either the con-
strained core or the open textured penumbra whenever we wish to exercise a more
political discretion. Either way, we can construct a desired result. In essence, Ken-
nedy concludes that determinacy is “a function of the worlds of valid norms, and of
the content of other sources, and also of their interaction with the resources and
strategies of whoever has the power to do legal interpretation.”51
The Malleability of Language and Common Article 3
The malleability of language within LOAC was amply demonstrated in the course
of the internal Bush administration debates concerning the application of Com-
mon Article 3 (CA 3) to the war in Afghanistan. Writing in January 2002, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo determined that the conflict then under way
in Afghanistan was an international armed conflict. However, according to Yoo,
neither Taliban nor Al Qaeda detainees were accorded prisoner of war status, be-
cause Afghanistan was a “failed State” and therefore the Geneva Conventions did
not apply.52 The question then to be decided was whether CA 3, which set a mini-
mal humanitarian standard for detainee treatment, applied as a matter of law. Yoo
determined that it did not and drew heavily upon a textual analysis of the provi-
sion. Significantly, the opinion Yoo drafted had an especially narrow determina-
tion of the application of CA 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Yoo opined
that CA 3 (which applies to “conflicts not of an international character”) was in-
tended to apply only to a condition of civil war or “large scale armed conflicts be-
tween a State and an armed movement within its own territory.”53
The opinion specifically relied upon a close textual analysis, as well as a histori-
cal account of the negotiating history and past practice of States. It concluded that
if CA 3 was to have a “cover all” reach, then it would have used “broader lan-
guage.”54 The “precise language”55 actually used restricted it to the type of conflicts
identified.
In reply, William Taft, the Department of State’s Legal Advisor, responded by
taking issue with the reading of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,
stressing that “[t]he President should know that a decision that the Conventions
do apply is consistent with the plain language of the Conventions.”56 Moreover ap-
plication of the Conventions “demonstrates that the United States bases its con-
duct not just on its policy preferences but on its international legal obligations.”57
Ultimately, President Bush determined that CA 3 did not apply de jure but “as a
matter of policy” humane treatment to the extent “consistent with military neces-
sity”58 would be accorded to detainees.59
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Subsequently, the executive assertion that CA 3 did not apply to the conflict
with Al Qaeda was litigated before the Supreme Court. In the 2006 Hamdan case,60
the Court held that the term “conflict not of an international character” contained
within CA 3 was used in contradistinction to “conflict between nations.” Hence
the phrase “‘not of an international character’ bears its literal meaning”61 and, as
such, applied effectively to all armed conflicts that are not between nation-States,
thus constituting CA 3 and its minimal standards as a “cover all.”
The remarkable feature of this composite line of executive and judicial reason-
ing was the reliance upon “precise,” “plain” and “literal” meaning of the words and
yet such reliance produced widely divergent conclusions. In its terms the Yoo
opinion was a credible enough exposition of the law, yet it seemed profoundly
wrong in its recognition of a gap vis-à-vis a legal obligation to observe even mini-
mal humanitarian standards for detainees. Were Taft and the Supreme Court
better at linguistic construction and was CA 3 terminology “self-evidently” in the
core of meaning? Or perhaps was “legal work” at play? Was this rather about wise
international relations (IR) policy,62 or perhaps checking executive excess63 or per-
haps retaining a moral high ground for instrumental reasons?64
The debate about the semantic placement of CA 3 is replicated with numerous
key terms throughout LOAC. Issues concerning the correct interpretation of “mil-
itary advantage,”65 of the “nature” of an objective that renders it liable to attack,66
of whether “war-fighting or war-sustaining” capability is a legitimate military ob-
jective,67 of how “reasonable” must be the grounds for boarding and attacking ves-
sels under the right of visit and search or blockade in naval warfare,68 of the issue of
sufficient “effectiveness” in aerial and naval blockade,69 of the application of the
precautionary principle to weapons selection (particularly by those countries pos-
sessing high-technology weaponry)70 and, of course, what counts as “proportionate”
loss71 are all illustrative of the many interpretive issues that occupy contentious
and/or ambiguous decision making under the law. Invariably many of these mat-
ters are usually decided by recourse to “judgment.”72 Within this indeterminacy it
becomes evident that legal arguments are calibrated less in terms of lawful and un-
lawful, and more in terms of differing degrees of lawfulness. In so doing, a different
style of legal reasoning develops that is more amenable to policy influence. Perhaps
this can be reconciled with Hart’s sense of penumbral reasoning, or perhaps it indi-
cates that the register of legitimacy (with a small dose of Holmes’s predictivism)73
provides better explanatory power for how LOAC is applied in practice, an expla-
nation that gives a sufficient basis to deal with the political and moral advantage
sought to be generated through lawfare.
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The Register of Legitimacy
Writing in 1952, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht famously observed that “if international
law is . . . at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is perhaps even more conspic-
uously at the vanishing point of international law.”74 This dire warning of LOAC’s
diminished relevance has in fact been breathtakingly challenged in succeeding
years and rendered meaningless. Over the past few decades there has been an “ex-
plosion” of treaties, restatements, handbooks, institutional assimilation and deep
professional military and academic investment with LOAC. This has been partly
driven by a strategy of pragmatic engagement by humanitarian voices.75
Rather than law becoming assimilated at the “vanishing point” of international
politics, the reverse seems to have happened. LOAC and its underlying principles
have been embraced by political elites and invoked in a vernacular of legitimacy to
further broader strategic claims. Certainly from the first Gulf War onward, law
has been invoked and heralded as providing decisive support for broader cam-
paign advocacy.76 There is no doubt now that compliance with the law forms part
of the political discourse as to the legitimacy of a conflict. Witness the negative con-
sequences of the Abu Ghraib events in Iraq,77 or even more recently, the German-
initiated tanker attack in Afghanistan,78 to identify the correlation between jus in
bello considerations and broader political and social identification with the legiti-
macy of a military campaign.
This phenomenon is being tracked within the legal literature. David Kennedy
has observed that the practice of international law, and especially that of LOAC,
has become a variegated process of input and reaction from relevant constituen-
cies. Traction of legal arguments has become measured more in terms of persua-
sion within such constituencies than technical mastery of legal construction. In
short, a register of legitimacy complements that of legality. Kennedy notes that
“[i]nternational law has become the metric for debating the legitimacy of military
action . . . [and that] law now shapes the politics of war,”79 and, further:
In the court of world public opinion, the laws in force are not necessarily the rules that
are valid, in some technical sense, but the rules that are persuasive to relevant political
constituencies. Whether a norm is or is not legal is a function not of its origin or pedi-
gree, but of its effects. Law has an effect—is law—when it persuades an audience with
political clout that something someone else did, or plans to do, is or is not legiti-
mate. . . . The fact that the modern law in war is expressed in the keys of both validity
and persuasion makes the professional use of its vocabulary both by humanitarian and
military professionals a complex challenge.80
In this context, ethical and political corroboration with legal rules becomes in-
evitable. We leave behind the smooth reassurance of an external judicial standard
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and enter a more dynamic though unfamiliar and contentious world—one where
law has its rightful place, but its purchase is of a variable nature. In describing this
recent phenomenon Kennedy observes:
International lawyers became less interested in whether a rule was valid—in the sense
that it could be said to be rooted in consent, in sovereignty or in the nature of an inter-
sovereign community—than in whether it worked. International law was what inter-
national law did. The observations of sociologists or political scientists about what
functioned as a restraint or a reason became more important than the ruminations of
jurists in determining what international law was and was not. As one might imagine, it
became ever less possible to say in advance or with precision what rules would, in fact,
be effective as law. To do so was to make a prediction about what would, in the end, be
enforced. Acting under cover of law became a wager that the action’s legality would be
upheld in the unfolding of state practice. Moreover, it became clear that the effective-
ness of rules depended less on something intrinsic to the rule than on aspects of
society—how powerful was its proponent, how insistent its enforcement, how persua-
sive its reasons to the broad public who would determine its legitimacy.81
The perspective presented by Kennedy concerning the variable nature of legal
norms is representative of a wave of critical reassessment. Over the recent past
there have been a number of theories put forward that seek to rationalize the rela-
tivity of legal norms within international law. Whether predicated upon notions
of “compliance pull”82 or theories of transnational politico-legal iteration,83 they
all share recognition of a corroborative role of politics/policy as fused with con-
ceptions of legitimacy. In assessing the themes proffered, a model of the law as a
justificatory discourse84 begins to emerge, one that belies too obvious political
self-interest with appeals to a broader legitimacy. This is not to say that bad legal
arguments cannot still be distinguished from good ones.85 It does acknowledge
though that the vernacular of persuasion has more resonance than appeals to ped-
igree or some kind of external validity. As one commentator has noted, legal dis-
course within the international realm is not
the search for some legal truth “out there,” waiting to be discovered. It is a practice that
operates on the basis of common understandings and shared beliefs about the relation-
ship governed by the rules in question. Thus interpretation of international law is the
search for an intersubjective understanding of the norm at issue.86
Critically, the point is not one of “all things considered” subjective policy
choice, but rather choice within the indeterminacy of the law. Such choice has been
likened to “politics within the law”87 or perhaps the “legalisation of politics.”88 In
determining how choices are to be made, some commentators have pointed to the
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role of “general principles” of the law as reflected in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice as providing a durable catalog. Such principles
proliferate throughout international law and often form complementary and op-
posing pairs.89 Hence within LOAC, the principle of military necessity is counter-
poised against the principle of humanity, and each may be relied upon to advance a
particular interpretive perspective. Kalshoven has argued that such principles
themselves reflect particularized social, historical and ethical traditions and are
sustained by an “inner force”90 that is “moral in nature.”91
The move to a frame of legitimacy and to acknowledging the power of political
persuasion as part of a justificatory process signals a significant departure from the
positivist firmament of external standards and linguistic precision. Perhaps we are
still within the positivist frame but are situated deeply within the penumbral region
described by Hart where a more freewheeling exercise of policy-like discretion is
permitted. If so, the penumbra is more than just a narrow band, but rather occu-
pies a much larger space. The type of legal practice and interpretive style currently
being theorized actually signals a reflection of the type of reasoning advanced by
the American legal realist movement of the 1920s and ’30s. This movement sought
to accommodate the indeterminacy of law and in so doing wanted to implement a
more self-aware process of legal reasoning92—one critically predicated upon a con-
ception of social scientific methodology that could more productively guide rele-
vant canons of interpretation.93
Counterinsurgency, Stabilization Operations and American Legal Realism
This move to a more instrumentalized form of legal reasoning has found explicit
expression in the recently published US COIN and stabilization doctrines. Legal
interpretation of LOAC became contextualized in seeking to achieve specific political
and military outcomes. The US COIN doctrine was developed against the exigencies
of the increasing violence in Iraq in 2005–6. General Petraeus and others reviewed
counterinsurgency best practices, and thinking “outside the box” developed a
strategy for dealing with the increasingly pressing insurgency. It was in fact a blue-
print for “a strategy waiting to be implemented as everything else failed in Iraq.”94
The resulting COIN manual grapples with the new realities of postmodern war
and recommends decisive change. Indeed, the introduction to the manual makes it
very clear that it intends to set a new course. Within the first paragraph, the point is
abruptly made that “[t]hose who fail to see the manual as radical probably don’t
understand it, or at least understand what it’s up against.”95
The manual deals with a number of legal propositions and directs an interpre-
tive methodology that is decisively instrumental. These are tailor-made to attain
strategic effect within the context of an insurgency. The doctrine contains a number
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of paradoxes that seem counterintuitive to prevailing approaches to legal interpre-
tation. These include:
• Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be,96
• Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,97
• Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,98 and
• The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and
the more risk must be accepted.99
It is evident that COIN doctrine knowingly places greater physical risk on coun-
terinsurgent forces. It fully concedes that choices will need to be made that will re-
sult in higher counterinsurgent casualties. These truisms necessarily test resolve as
well as public expectation. They also provide a meaningful counter to the political
and moral advantage that is sought by insurgent forces through lawfare techniques.
It turns out that political and social success in the field provides the best antidote to
lawfare susceptibility at home as well as within the relevant theater of operations.100
The COIN and stability operations doctrines have proven, within Iraq at least, to
provide a reliable framework to reach that goal. General restraint and an allocation
of particular ethical and social value to the consequences of violence have provided
a more durable context for legal interpretation.
Within an insurgency, those taking a direct or active part in hostilities are osten-
sibly targetable under the DPH provisions of LOAC. As outlined earlier in this arti-
cle, little differentiation is traditionally made between hard-core insurgents and
those who are more loosely associated with an insurgency (but who nonetheless
come within the DPH formula). There is, as previously highlighted, an assumption
of mathematical precision that underpins this approach to legal reasoning under
LOAC. In challenging this blanket legal categorization the Multi-National Force–
Iraq guidelines, reflecting the COIN doctrine, introduced a more nuanced target-
ing strategy that was based upon the question of reconcilability and modified legal
approaches. Hence the guidelines stated bluntly:
We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify
and separate the “reconcilables” from the “irreconcilables” through engagement, pop-
ulation control measures, information operations and political activities. We must
strive to make reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue and kill,
capture or drive out the irreconcilables.101
This required a greater use of intelligence to understand deeper tribal and pro-
vincial networks and allegiances. Understanding relevant ethnography and intra-
tribal group dynamics gave a better context for instrumental thinking. It also
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meant that a substantive differentiation could be made between the hard-core in-
surgent and the “accidental guerilla” with respect to targeting. These more
nuanced approaches combine with a revised legal interpretive methodology that
seeks to promote a particular effect with respect to targeting choices.
In relation to the principle of proportionality, the COIN manual similarly sig-
nals a self-conscious variation on the manner in which this legal standard is usually
interpreted by concentrating upon political and social alienation. The manual
states:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. In COIN operations, [military] advantage is best calculated not in terms of how
many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained.
. . . In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property destroyed
needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could do if al-
lowed to escape.102
The commentary notes that the principles of discrimination and proportional-
ity have an additional sociopolitical significance that must be factored into any in-
terpretive exercise under the law, stating that “[f]ires that cause unnecessary harm
or death to noncombatants may create more resistance and increase the insur-
gency’s appeal—especially if the populace perceives a lack of discrimination in
their use.”103
Law, Legitimacy and Interpretive Space
In reconciling the recourse to legitimacy with legal interpretive theory, a broader
opportunity arises to grapple with lawfare—not least of which is the ability to
meaningfully address the political and moral advantage sought by non-State ac-
tors. The COIN and stability operations doctrines provide an illuminating insight
into how the calibrated application of force can result in achieving identified military
and political effects at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Indeed, military
journals these days disclose a fascination by military operators with the implica-
tions of force in terms of psychological, sociological and anthropological effect as a
means of fulfilling mission accomplishment goals.104 Military lawyers have, of ne-
cessity, been part of that experience.
When we speak in the register of legality in familiar terms of classic modern positiv-
ism, we must be aware of what this implicates and the vulnerabilities it exposes. We
still rely upon this methodology because it retains sufficient explanatory “horse-
power” for some audiences in some circumstances. Such circumstances would, of
course, encompass formal litigation processes. They would also be more likely in a
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“State-on-State” conventional warfare context, which is the background in which
LOAC was principally developed, or even when dealing with an “irreconcilable” in a
COIN context. The disquiet that is felt by some that lawfare techniques can under-
mine military efforts seems geared to this concept and context of legal exposition.
As has been outlined, however, the register of formal legality is not well
equipped to deal with social, political or moral critiques. But this is only one con-
cept or version of interpretive valence. In a broader day-to-day context, the inter-
play between law, legitimacy, policy and politics has become well understood by
military lawyers, if not expressly, at least intuitively as a different narrative of the
law. Some might reconcile these interactions as mere policy overlay of hard law at
the core of legal meaning. Or they could perhaps be reconciled as occurring in the
(broad) penumbral region of discretion of Hart’s conception of positivism, or by
invoking and assimilating American legal realist techniques (we are, after all, “all
realists now”),105 or perhaps as forming a competing legal methodology of norma-
tive legal relativism and pluralism.
However these interactions are reconciled from a theoretical perspective, the
fact is that military lawyers have in practice adopted a more informed attitude to
interpretation that has kept pace with broader national and international strategies
for military action. The recent COIN and stabilization doctrines and their support-
ing interpretive legal approaches are designed precisely to counter adverse political
and social reaction in order to obtain military advantage. They represent strong el-
ements of counter-lawfare in their ontological premise. As will be discussed below,
departing the safe moorings of a register of legality for one of legitimacy allows for a
more instrumental approach to achieving mission outcomes. Though not without
risk, it also offers the means by which lawfare techniques used by non-State actors
can be decisively met and defeated.
Part III. Legal Choice by Military Lawyers in a Pluralist Environment
If, as I have contended, the legal framework of LOAC generates considerable inter-
pretive space, military lawyers necessarily have a complex responsibility in recon-
ciling multiple factors when shaping their advice. Notwithstanding this challenge,
it is a theme of this article that military lawyers are well equipped to deal with
lawfare. Such skills have developed quite independently as part of the general nature
of dispensing advice within LOAC practice. The purpose of this part is to explore
the exogenous factors that underpin military legal decision making. First will be an
analysis of means-ends rationality, looking particularly at IR theories as to how
the law is used to mobilize political action. Second will be an examination of
constructivism, which seeks to demonstrate how internalization of normative legal
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standards can result in generating a sense of self-identity and interpretive attitude.
Finally, the part will conclude with a survey of virtue ethics, which have particular
resonance within the military ethos and can be understood as a basis for adopting
particular legal strategies of support or resistance.
Means-Ends Rationality and Politicization of Law
Public opinion is often readily acknowledged by military lawyers as having
considerable effect in driving government policy. Of course in the context of
lawfare, domestic public opinion is a decisive strategic target, yet there is little un-
derstanding of how law gets metabolized by advocates to prompt the type of politi-
cal mobilization that subsequently shapes opinion.
To this end international lawyers and international legal scholarship generally
exhibit what Jack Goldsmith has referred to as a “methodological unsophis-
tication.”106 Lawyers generally have a predilection to favor formal over functional
and are less interested in examining causality.107 They tend to assume law’s role in
directing policy choice as a given. Conversely, IR theory seeks to explain interna-
tional behavior more “realistically” and thus takes “theoretical, methodological,
and empirical issues more seriously, and . . . draw[s] more generously on econom-
ics, sociology, and history.”108 Generally speaking, IR scholars review international
behavior in terms of power, interests, institutions, beliefs or ideas. International
law can have normative effect within these mechanisms of influence but not in the
manner in which most lawyers possibly anticipate.
In describing how international legal norms can be invoked to initiate or sustain
political mobilization, Simmons observes that treaty ratification can be seen as an
anchor for creating domestic and international advocacy networks; hence
“[t]reaties can change values and beliefs and can change the probability of successful
political action to achieve the rights they promulgate.”109 She notes that ratification
affects elite agendas, supports litigation and has a particular capacity to mobilize
political action among epistemic communities.110 Treaty ratification, according to
Simmons, signals not only a “costly signal of intent,” but also marks a decisive step
in “domestic legitimation,” thus fostering a precommitment to receptivity by a
government, increases the size of the mobilizing coalition, enhances “intangible”
resources and expands the range of political and legal compliance strategies.111
Similarly, Keck and Sikkink catalog how treaty ratification creates channels of ac-
cess for those motivated by shared values and structured mechanisms for informa-
tion exchange. These authors present both rationalist (language of incentives and
constraints, strategies, institutions, rules) and constructivist (norms, social rela-
tions and intersubjective understandings) foundations to ground their analysis of
the mechanisms of social and political pressure that can be generated by
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politicizing legal norms.112 Interestingly, the authors refer to “frames” of mean-
ing113 to “alter the information and value contexts within which states make poli-
cies,” which in turn involve “not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing
pressure, arm twisting, encouraging sanctions, and shaming.”114
The concept of framing provides a useful context for understanding LOAC
politicization. The issue of banning anti-personnel landmines, for example, which
ultimately resulted in the drafting of the Ottawa anti-personnel mines conven-
tion,115 was originally discussed in terms of military utility and saving soldiers’
lives. When the debate was subsequently “framed” by advocates in terms of indis-
criminate effect upon civilians, there developed an unstoppable momentum for
universal banning. It is in the context of individual vulnerability to military vio-
lence that political mobilization of LOAC norms seems to be the most effective.
Keck and Sikkink note that “issues involving physical harm to vulnerable or inno-
cent human individuals appear particularly compelling”116 for network organiza-
tion (issue of framing personified). Consistent with this observation, it is not
surprising to see that trenchant arguments of lex specialis vis-à-vis international
human rights law are usually relaxed when it comes to issues such as detainee treat-
ment. Even if the de jure extraterritorial application of human rights law is not
accepted, at least its normative underpinnings are observed through humanitarian
policy stipulations—partly as recognition of that public expectation that such stan-
dards will be applied.
This recognition of the use of law to press moral and political leverage from a
domestic audience is not lost on military lawyers and, of course, is relied upon as
part of any lawfare campaign. Means-ends rationality concerning public support is
implicitly part of the military decision-making calculus that underpins approaches
to the law, whether consciously acknowledged or subconsciously registered. LOAC
includes tremendous license for the application of destructive power; however, its
full exercise is unlikely to be pressed. Indeed, legal assessment of mainstream military
action is rarely undertaken to decide whether something is legal or illegal. Rather,
as previously noted, it is much more a case of deciding between various iterations
of legal justification and construing the better arguments, which may range from
merely colorable through to compelling. Deciding whether something is merely
legal, of course, does not mean that it is good policy and this is where means-ends
rationality invariably enters the equation. Questions concerning public support,
institutional reputation, ethical orientation, self-image, internal discipline and nu-
merous other inchoate factors are part of that mix. In discussing the nature of the
resistance exhibited by a number of senior US military lawyers to aspects of the
Bush administration’s legal framework for the war on terror, Hatfield notes: “The
military lawyers deferred to the law as an accumulation of hard-won institutional
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wisdom. They believed the law against torture to be a reality-based warning to keep
us from being doomed to learn the same lessons (usually referred to as ‘those from
Vietnam’) again and again.”117
The Vietnam War and its consequences loom large in the literature. There is a
sense that something intangible was lost in that conflict and that the decades since
have been devoted to a restoration of professional ethos within the military and a
reach for renewed public trust. The specific correlation between the Vietnam conflict
and LOAC is also emphasized. In a recent article, retired Colonel David Graham
observes that events like the My Lai incident “caused great consternation and soul
searching among Americans generally,”118 and was a catalyst for initiating compre-
hensive and profound revision and prioritization of the law of war training within
the military.119
If lawfare is partly predicated upon a strategy of decisively influencing public
opinion, then it is logical that lawyers should better understand applicable IR
theories that detail the pathways in which law is politicized for this very purpose.
Indeed, the incorporation of public affairs officers within most chains of command
evidences the general institutional recognition by the broader military of the deci-
sive power of public opinion in liberal democratic societies. Due to a number of
reasons, not the least of which is a lack of relevant social scientific training,120 law-
yers seem reluctant to undertake an analysis of law’s effect upon political mobiliza-
tion. These perspectives allow lawfare strategies a head start. The rationalist and
constructivist methodologies used by advocacy groups to influence political deci-
sion making should be better understood so that alternative arguments can be
meaningfully mounted in response. Similarly, the issue of “framing” LOAC issues
to mobilize public opinion in order to achieve a particular political result might be
usefully studied to better understand and anticipate different perspectives.
Constructivism and a Logic of Appropriateness
Constructivism is an ideational theory of IR that posits that national interests are
shaped by international structures. Hence national identity is partly “constructed”
by international legal norms that create and disperse beliefs. This realization is
predicated upon the partial or full internalization of legal norms through a process
of coercion, persuasion or acculturation,121 leading to an overall acceptance of the
normative force of international law, in this case LOAC. A “logic of appropriate-
ness” as opposed to a “logic of consequence”122 ensues; hence it is less instrumen-
talist than other competing IR theories.
Under the constructivism mantle, psychological factors can permit “shaping” of
perspectives through a conscious or unconscious acknowledgment of global mili-
tary isomorphism.123 Moreover, constructivism seeks to provide an answer for
346
The Age of Lawfare
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:35 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
normative adherence to the tenets of LOAC. Examples of this process at work
through the constructivist lens would include the unique universality of ratifica-
tion of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (the only treaty series in the world to achieve
this coveted status), the de-emphasis of reciprocity as a basis for an obligation to
comply with the LOAC (famously reinforced by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia in the Kupreskic case)124 and the enhancement of
legal “principles” (as opposed to treaties or customary international law which are
predicated upon State consent) based upon “elementary consideration of human-
ity,”125 morality126 and interstitial norms127 that have achieved greater sway in legal
interpretation. Constructivism also provides an explanation for why LOAC treaty
declarations and reservations are not, in practice, fully relied upon within interpre-
tive approaches to LOAC. Additionally, as discussed above, under the means-ends
rationality concept, it goes some way to explaining why, as a matter of “policy”
overlay, a number of human rights norms within armed conflict find resonance,
especially within the field of detention operations.
Constructivism, not surprisingly, provides the most comprehensive account of
social agency among competing IR theories. Some see this as a two-step process of
initial “role playing”128 that then leads to an internalization of norms. Goodman
and Jinks examine this further to differentiate between “persuasion,” a conscious
acceptance of the merits of an idea, and “acculturation,” under which partial inter-
nalization occurs through the phenomena of sociological micro-processes of mim-
icry, orthodoxy, identification, status maximization and avoidance of cognitive
dissonance.129
Constructivism provides an explanation for why military forces can come to
generate a level of self-identity from LOAC. Famously, during the Bush adminis-
tration debates about the de jure application of the Geneva Conventions to the war
in Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, resisted
their non-application, stating that “[t]he Geneva Conventions were a fundamental
part of our military culture and every military member was trained on them. . . .
Objectively applying the Conventions was important to our self image.”130 This
sentiment is echoed by other military members who asked who “owned” the
Geneva Conventions, the civilian lawyers or the military.131 Plainly there was a level
of deep cognitive dissonance that came from a perception of civilian technical legal
manipulation. Such questioning suggests a strong sense of internalization of
norms associated with the legal framework.
Constructivists also posit the view that their theory helps explain the non-use
of nuclear and chemical weapons at times when their legality was still evolving
and rationalist theories would have expected such use.132 While these theories may
be overstated and fail to account for the types of means-end rationality arguments
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outlined above, or more generally for simple military utility, they nonetheless do
provide a credible basis to understand disposition. If, in fact, the military “owns”
LOAC as many so perceive, then normative adherence has less to do with external
legal controls than with an internal orientation of self-image. As such, arguments
of legal propriety find a receptive audience in the military and permit a more
nuanced view of the application of force. This does not deny the availability of ful-
some legal arguments to ensure complete mission accomplishment. It does, how-
ever, allow for a “base” internal attitude toward legitimacy of action that has been
accepted—one that is not oblivious to the significance of moral and social conse-
quences concerning the application of force.
Virtue Ethics
Unlike deontology or utilitarianism, which are forms of external moral guidance
“where [an] agent has to bring his will and action in line with universal moral
laws . . . or to maximize the common good,”133 virtue ethics deal with a deeply
personal orientation toward living life. Of Aristotelian origin, virtue ethics are con-
cerned with consistent personal examination of our own behavior. Mark Osiel
notes that “virtue is a property of our character, not our relation to others, even if
evidenced in such relations.”134 Osiel points to a form of virtue ethics as the moti-
vating factor that led a number of senior US judge advocates to resist some Bush
administration policies which were thought to undermine a particular balance in
the framework of LOAC.135 The motivation was not necessarily based upon
means-ends rationality, or even a conscious expression of internalized legal norms;
rather they were motivated by a deeper sense of felt professional honor.
Interestingly, virtue ethics have been viewed as a more reliable basis for action
than “altruistic obligations to others and braver than self-interest.”136 Importantly,
they represent something of a reversion to an aristocratic commitment of living a
life based upon a sense of reflective equilibrium.137 Critically, the motivation is not
premised upon any sense of (human) rights discourse, but rather a reflection of
personal integrity. Hence with respect to the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG)
Corps approach to detainee operations, Osiel observes that the felt sentiment was
that “the duties we owe to those we have detained as terror suspects should best be
understood . . . as an inference from the duties we owe our fellow citizens to behave
honorably, consistent with our identity as a people constitutively committed to the
rule of law.”138
The military is particularly susceptible to the agency of virtue ethics as codes
of behavior and service values are ritually emphasized in all professional military
organizations around the world. Moral courage, as much as physical courage, is
highly prized, and heuristic devices that transmit and reinforce this virtue are
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consistently deployed. As Osiel notes, one such shorthand expression is reflected
in the oft-used statement “Marines don’t do that.”139 Similarly, the line of a JAG
Corps defender of a Guantanamo detainee, “It’s not about them, it’s about us,”140
conveys the depth of this appeal to virtue ethics, as does the refrain “Lose Moral
Legitimacy, Lose the War” outlined within the COIN manual.141 That this particu-
lar perspective should have explanatory power for choices made under the law is
not all that surprising. The business of warfare is brutal and deeply intimate.
Drawing upon a self-illuminated moral identity is, or should be, a necessary con-
sequence of such decision making. It does necessarily inform decision making in a
manner independent from means-ends rationality and constructivist internaliza-
tion theories. Of course, targeting and other operational decision making has
become highly bureaucratized142 and there is the sense of a loss of responsibility
through the battery of iterated routines.143 Yet, there is always space at the strate-
gic, operational and tactical levels where independent judgment is exercised under
LOAC and it is here, within those spaces, where virtue ethics have some explana-
tory power for decision making. As such, the recognition of virtue ethics as a moti-
vating force within the military acts as a sort of default setting to counter lawfare
strategies that aim to ignite overreaction and violation of moral standards.
Conclusion
The typical sentiment expressed when dealing with assertions of lawfare is that it is
a pernicious tactic that exploits the vulnerabilities of “law-abiding” States. The fact
is that the practice of law, including LOAC, has always taken place on a highly con-
tested terrain of social and political norms. What the phenomenon of lawfare does
is highlight the perceptions of the limitations under the positivist framework in ad-
dressing and countering its goals. All contemporary accounts of positivism today
reveal a level of interpretive space where broader social and policy considerations
can be infused into legal interpretation. It has been a strong theme of this article
that the interpretive space is much broader than what might be imagined.
Correlatively, it is also a theme that LOAC is more indeterminate than what might
be hoped. Hence, whether reconciled as the interplay between law and policy, or
being an interpretive act within Hart’s penumbral region, or representing a new
format of legitimacy, the means exist by which the goals sought in a malevolent
lawfare strategy can be decisively countered. Evidence of these opportunities al-
ready exists within the COIN and stability operations environment, but these new
doctrines merely represent aspects of a broader reality about interpretive
approaches.
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In understanding the choices that are available to military legal officers when in-
terpreting and applying the law, there are a number of factors that do get included
in the decision-making calculus beyond mere textual excursus. Means-ends ratio-
nality and the role of public opinion have always been relevant considerations. In
accepting this, legal analysis should borrow from IR theory to better understand
the manner in which the law is used as part of political advocacy projects.
Constructivism provides another explanatory theory for why normative features of
the law are internalized and why there exists a strong sentiment that LOAC is
“owned” by the military. Such an understanding assists in anticipating the margins
of appreciation that may be at play when grappling with the decision-making pro-
cesses under LOAC. Similarly, virtue ethics sometimes play an unconscious
though vital part of the interpretive experience and permit a reliably professional
assessment of law’s purpose in relation to military decision making.
The issue of equipoise between principles of military necessity and humanity
remains central to the interpretive endeavor of LOAC. As a fundamental touch-
stone of every interpretive exercise in any register of approach is the observations
of Professor Dinstein, who poignantly notes that
[e]very single norm of LOIAC [the law of international armed conflict] is moulded
by a parallelogram of forces: it confronts a built-in tension between the relentless de-
mands of military necessity and humanitarian considerations, working out a com-
promise formula. The outlines of the compromise vary from one LOIAC norm to
another. Still, in general terms, it can be stated categorically that no part of LOIAC
overlooks military requirements, just as no part of LOIAC loses sight of humanitarian
considerations.144
The expression of such a “categorical imperative” provides a critical foundation
for directing the trajectory of any interpretive approach. While lawfare is derided
as an unfair or malevolent means to an ulterior end, its recognition permits a
deeper appreciation of the social and political context in which law is used to un-
derpin military decision making. This requires that the inevitable moral and politi-
cal dilemmas encountered in such decision making be consciously faced if legal
advice is to be rendered meaningful. Central to this exercise is the critical need to
balance military and humanitarian considerations, always and everywhere, as a
matter of legal rectitude. It also prompts a necessary acknowledgment of the special
role military lawyers have in dispensing advice under the law, in whose name they
must always responsibly act.
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